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Beyond Kent and Gault: Consensual
Searches and Juveniles
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of juvenile justice in the United States began to
surge in the late 1960's when the United States Supreme Court
recognized that juvenile courts provided neither the due process
we were accustomed to as a free nation, nor the paternal gui-
dance we had bargained for in return.1 There was no quid for the
quo. Kent v. United States2 and In re Gault3 were the landmark
cases which called for a return of due process rights to children.
Through the measured process which marks the wisdom of con-
stitutional adjudication, children now enjoy nearly all the protec-
tions accorded adults.4 Procedural due process is an everyday
reality as to most aspects of modern juvenile courts.
If procedural rights in the adjudicative phase of the juvenile
justice system have experienced almost a complete reversal since
In re Gault, what of the constitutional protections during the
preadjudicatory phase of the process? The answer is sim-
1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
2. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Kent Court considered the requirements for a
valid waiver by a juvenile court and first articulated that due process could apply
to juvenile proceedings.
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Gault, the watershed case, granted juveniles faced
with the possibility of commitment to a state institution the right to adequate no-
tice in advance of charges against them, id. at 33-34; the right to counsel, id. at 41;
the privilege against self incrimination, id. at 55; and the right to cross-examine
and confront witnesses, id. at 57.
4. The list of "non-criminal" constitutional rights has come to include matters
of fundamental import: protection against racial discrimination, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954); freedom of speech, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968); right to a hearing prior to suspen-
sion from school, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 569, 579 (1975); right to have an abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy, Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 61 (1975); right of children under sixteen years of age to purchase con-
traceptives, Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1977); and right to
a hearing, before parents may have minor child fourteen years of age or older put
into a state mental hospital, In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 927, 569 P.2d 1286, 1289,
141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (1977). See note 17 infra for a list of "criminal" constitu-
tional rights. Strictly speaking, however, these are not "criminal" rights since the
juvenile justice system has been conceptualized as a "civil" process. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). But in actuality, the jurisprudence grants
juveniles the protections afforded criminal defendants.
ple-Gault and its progeny have left unresolved the question as
to what extent their mandate logically extends to the preadjudi-
catory stages, particularly the police investigatory process. In a
case of such profound import the tendency is to extend the rule to
its logical conclusion.5 Gault has proved to be no exception. Just
as its applicability has been extended to cover police interroga-
tion of juveniles6 and lineups, 7 it has also been construed to re-
quire application of the Fourth Amendment 8 and the exclusionary
rule to the juvenile justice system.9
5. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); W. SCHAE-
FER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 27 (1967); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
6. In Gault, it was specifically held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to juvenile proceedings. 387 U.S. at 55. This, in
turn, has been interpreted to mean that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
applies to juveniles as well. See, e.g., In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296,
75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); and In re Rust,
53 Misc. 2d. 51, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Fam. Ct. 1967). See also Comment, Juvenile Con-
fessions: Whether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally Permissible Confes-
sions, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1976); Note, The Confessions of Juveniles,
5 WILLAMETTE L. J. 66 (1968).
7. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, lower courts have
assumed that the United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), trilogy apply to juve-
nile lineup cases. See, e.g., In re Holley, 197 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970); In re Carl
T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1969), see also Cannon, Lineups In Deten-
tion Are Constitutionally Impermissible, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 441 (1970) (sug-
gesting that a juvenile should never be subjected to a lineup).
8. None of the cases decided by the Supreme Court thus far have held that
the Fourth Amendment is applicable to juveniles within a juvenile court context.
However, virtually all lower courts that have considered the issue have held or as-
sumed that it is. See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); In re
Jean M., 16 Cal. App. 3d 96, 93 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1971); In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d
990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968); State v.
Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967). For excellent commentary on the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the pretrial stage in the criminal justice
process, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PO-
LICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS (tent. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JUS-
TICE STANDARDS]; S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
54-59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RIGHTS OF JUVENILES]; Comment, Juvenile Rights
Under the Fourth Amendment, 11 J. FAM. L. 753 (1972).
9. Though the United States Supreme Court has not yet considered the ques-
tion whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be or will be held
applicable to juvenile court proceedings, there are courts and commentators who
have answered in the affirmative. See, e.g., In re J.M.A., 542 P.2d 170 (Alaska 1975);
In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972); In re Carl T., 1
Cal. App. 3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1969); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super.
1971); Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F. 2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nelson v. State and Newman v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); In re Marsh,
40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E. 2d 529 (1968); People v. Hughes, 123 111. App. 2d 115, 260 N.E.2d
34 (1970); State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643, 549 P.2d 886 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.
App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974); State v. Lowry, and In re B., 95 N.J.
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The matter of searches and seizures, however, and particularly
consensual searches, has been given little judicial attention in
connection with juvenile court proceedings. Nevertheless, it
seems likely, in view of the pressure of increasing lawlessness
and social ferment, that consent problems will arise with increas-
ing frequency in juvenile court cases in the next decade. Accord-
ingly, this comment will assess whether juveniles should be
afforded the same, greater, or lesser constitutional protections in
the area of consensual searches as is currently afforded their
adult counterparts. It will first, however, be necessary to examine
the development of juvenile rights in order to provide a concep-
tual perspective from which to view consent searches. Next, the
concept of "voluntary consent" and its functional validity in the
context of a search will be analyzed. Finally, the area of parental
consent to search a juvenile's room and personal effects will be
explored.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF JUVENILE RIGHTS
In 1899, Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act, creating the first
statewide court especially for children.lO The idea of the juvenile
court spread with amazing speed. Within twelve years, twenty-
two states had enacted similar statues, and by 1925 all but two
states had followed Illinois' example.'
The juvenile court was a reaction to criticism of the then com-
mon practice of combining juvenile delinquents and adult
criminals in the same judicial and penal system. The separate
court, it was thought, would promote rehabilitation. The child
would receive special treatment in surroundings and from per-
Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re P., 40 App. Div. 2d 638, 336 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1972);
In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fam. Ct. 1963); In re Baker, 18 Ohio
App. 2d 276, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969); In re Morris, 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 278 N.E.2d 701
(C.P. 1971); In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972); Cuilla v. State,
434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968). See generally Comment, The Applicability of
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juveniles in Delinquency Proceed-
ings, 4 COLUM. HuMANRIGHTs L. REV. 417 (1972).
10. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
11. These states are Maine and Wyoming. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK REPORT], Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1190
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. The latter reference presents a detailed exami-
nation of juvenile judicial history. See also generally W. STAPLETON & L. TEITEL-
BAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 5-39 (1972); Note, Juvenile Delinquency-The History
and Development of Juvenile Courts, 12 N.Y.L.F. 644 (1966).
sons devoted to rehabilitation instead of punishment.12 The juve-
nile court's role was not to ascertain guilt or innocence but to
determine what should be done in the "best interest" of the
child.13 This unique court was based upon the theory of parens
patriae, which permits the state to act in loco parentis over way-
ward children. The state's duty as "parent" is to direct the child
along the proper path to a productive and lawful adulthood. 14
Unfortunately, the parens patriae doctrine of the juvenile sys-
tem, in its effort to provide the child with guidance and rehabilita-
tion, frequently operated at the expense of his basic
constitutional rights. However, it was not until the late 1960's that
the lack of procedural due process in juvenile proceedings began
to be challenged in the courts. It was in reaction to the abuses in
the juvenile justice system that Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for
the court in Kent v. United States,'5 stated:
There is evidence . . . that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protec-
tions accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children [in the juvenile courts].1 6
In four major decisions the United States Supreme Court
changed the contours of juvenile justice in the United States by
making applicable to juveniles some of the constitutional guaran-
tees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions.17 Basic to
12. Comment, Children's Liberation-Reforming Juvenile Justice , 21 KAN. L.
REV. 177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Children's Liberation].
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3;
Comment, Alternative Preadjudicatory Handling of Juveniles in South Dakota:
Time for Reform, 19 S. DAK. L. REV. 207, 208 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. Dak.
Juveniles].
14. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). See also Fox, supra note 11
at 1192; S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 13, at 208; Comment, In re Gault: Under-
standing the Attorney's New Role, 12 ViL. L. REV. 803 (1967); Comment, Juvenile
Justice and Pre-Adjudication Detention, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAsxA L. REV. 154 (1971).
15. 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
16. Id. at 556.
17. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In other contexts, the courts have found addi-
tional, though not all, guarantees of the criminal process applicable to the juvenile
process. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment protects the juvenile just as it does an adult). See also Peo-
ple v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 257, 551 P.2d 375, 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 69 (1976) (juve-
nile may not be held by the Youth Authority for a term exceeding that which
might be imposed upon an adult misdemeanant commiting the same offense); In
re Dana J. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 836, 841, 484 P.2d 595, 598, 94 Cal. Rptr. 619,
622 (1971) (minor entitled to a free transcript of trial for use on appeal if he is per-
sonally unable to afford counsel without regard to his parents' financial status); In
re Jean M., 16 Cal. App. 3d 96, 105, 93 Cal. Rptr. 679, 684 (1971) (sufficiency of evi-
dence for determination that a minor had knowingly been about a place in which
narcotics were unlawfully used); In re Michael M., 11 Cal. App. 3d 297, 301, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 718, 720 (1970) (plea of guilty in a juvenile proceeding may not be accepted
unless the defendant affirmatively waives his privilege against self-incrimination
and confrontation on the record).
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the acquisition of these protections was the imposition of the pro-
cedural due process standard of fundamental fairness in juvenile
proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court first confronted the issue of
fundamental fairness in Kent v. United States.18 Speaking to the
waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile courts, Mr. Justice Fortas recog-
nized the statutory right to the benefits of juvenile jurisdiction
and the grievious effect of the loss of that right. Thus it was con-
cluded that the District of Columbia statute allowing waiver, read
in light of the due process clause and the right to assistance of
counsel, required: an informal hearing, assistance of counsel, ac-
cess to records considered by the Court, and a statement of the
reasons for the decision.19 By requiring procedural due process at
juvenile hearings the Court began to restore to the juvenile some
of the rights he had lost under the protection of the parens pa-
triae doctrine.
The next case to reach the United States Supreme Court was
the landmark case of In re Gault,20 which dealt with the adjudica-
tion of delinquency. Once again Mr. Justice Fortas expressed the
Court's dissatisfaction with the realities of the juvenile system.
Noting that lack of procedural due process was an invitation to ar-
bitrariness and that the term delinquent had "come to involve
only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to
adults,"'2 1 the Court extended to juvenile proceedings four basic
constitutional protections generally associated with criminal tri-
als. These protections were: the right to counsel,22 the privilege
against self-incrimination, 23 adequate notice of the charges, 24 and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.25
In 1970 the Court again expanded the protection accorded to ju-
venile offenders when, in the case of In re Winship,26 it extended
the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to de-
linquency hearings. 27 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the ma-
18. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
19. Id. at 557.
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id. at 57.
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. Id. at 368.
jority, found no sufficient basis on which to allow a lesser
standard in juvenile proceedings, and rationalized the standard
would not adversely affect state policies precluding criminal con-
viction and deprivation of civil rights, or the confidentiality, infor-
mality, flexibility, and speed of the hearings.28
However, in the 1971 case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,29 this
expanding application of the constitutional guarantees associated
with traditional criminal prosecutions to juvenile proceedings
came to a halt when the Court refused to extend to juveniles the
right to trial by jury. The applicable due process in juvenile pro-
ceedings was stated as fundamental fairness for accurate fact
finding. 30 The plurality of four Justices found the impanelling of a
jury would not sufficiently aid in fact finding and would cause the
proceedings to become adversary, protracted, public, and less pro-
tective. 31 The Court could identify no failures of the juvenile jus-
tice system which would be remedied by the presence of a jury.32
Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that juries were not required as
long as some other protection against oppression by the state or
improper discharge of judicial duties could be found in the adjudi-
cative process. He found these protections in the ability of any
party so aggrieved to "appeal to the community at large . .. for
executive redress through the medium of public indignation."
33
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, based on his belief that neither the
sixth amendment nor the due process clause requires states to
provide criminal jury trials.34
The Supreme Court's approach to requests for due process in
juvenile proceedings reveals an attempt to maximize the effi-
ciency of the fact finding process without upsetting the rehabilita-
tive ideals of the juvenile justice system. 35 Parens patriae, while
not a byword for arbitrariness, is allowed to limit due process
when a rehabilitative goal will be furthered.
III. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
28. Id. at 366-67.
29. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
30. Id. at 543-51.
31. Id. at 545-51.
32. Id. at 547.
33. Id. at 555.
34. Id. at 557. Presently, however, the Supreme Court regards the McKeiver
decision as a retreat from the goal of full implementation of fundamental fairness
in the juvenile context. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).
35. See generally Simpson, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Ju-
venile Justice System, 64 CALvF. L. REV. 984 (1976), questioning the propriety of
this approach.
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and seizures 36 safeguards the privacy and security of individuals
from arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.37 Through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states are
subject to Fourth Amendment limitations equally with the federal
government.38
36. The United States Constitution provides in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Young, Searches and Seizures in Juvenile
Court Proceedings, 25 Juv. JUST. 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Searches &
Seizures]; Comment, Application of the Rules Against Search and Seizures to Ju-
venile Delinquency Proceedings, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 462 (1967); RIGHTS OF JUVENILES,
supra note 8, at 54-71. The framers of the Constitution, mindful of the use of gen-
eral warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American colonies prior
to the American Revolution realized that an "unrestricted power of search and
seizure could be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression," Mancus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961). For excellent and informative discussions
of the historical background of the Fourth Amendment, see generally W. TUDOR,
LIFE OF JAMES OTIS (1923); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1970); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (discussing at length the movement of 18th-century
England to abolish general warrants authorizing searches in, among other places,
private houses. Id. at 625-26.
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
38. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule provides that evi-
dence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a criminal
trial. First alluded to in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), applied in fed-
eral criminal cases in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and ultimately
imposed on the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The decision in Mapp
overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and held that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates full Fourth Amendment protections for state citizens
and that the exclusionary rule is a requisite element of this constitutional protec-
tion.
Confusion and controversy abound in commentary on the exclusionary rule. At
issue are the purposes of the rule, whether the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence at trial is or is not constitutionally required, whether the exclusionary rule
operates to deter Fourth Amendment violations, and ultimately whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be retained, expanded, or totally abandoned. For a contrast in
the rationale and constitutional status of the rule see Burns, Mapp v. Ohio, An All
American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L REV. 80, 100 (1969) (application of the exclusion-
ary rule to states is an attempt to create federal common law of search and seizure
and is unauthorized by the Constitution); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra:
The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 372
(1974) (defendant has a personal constitutional right to exclusion of illegally
seized evidence under both the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause).
There is a conflict of opinions as to whether the exclusionary rule has effectively
deterred illegal police conduct. Compare Carron, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Fail-
ing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62
KY.L.J. 681, 725-26 (1974) (empirical evidence does not warrant conclusion that ex-
clusionary rule fails to deter), with Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
The United States Supreme Court's decisions on the Fourth
Amendment stress that the primary source of governmental au-
thority to conduct searches is a validly issued warrant.39 This pol-
icy is so strong that a search conducted without a warrant issued
upon probable cause is presumptively unreasonable. 40 Despite
the mandate that all searches are subject to prior judicial review
through application for a warrant, a myriad of exceptions to the
warrant requirement exist, including searches incident to a lawful
arrest,41 searches conducted while in hot pursuit of an offender,42
searches undertaken in an emergency situation,43 and searches
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665, 755-56 (1970) (exclusionary rule fails to
deter and should be abolished on condition that viable substitute is adopted). See
also Wilkes, A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The
Historical Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 900-01
(1975) (exclusionary rule is necessary today to inhibit "%idespread police corrup-
tion and abuse of power"); Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An
Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1129, 1163-64 (1973) (apart from deterrence, judicial integrity mandates expansion
of exclusionary rule beyond trial setting).
For a concise analysis of the current status of the exclusionary rule and alterna-
tive remedies for Fourth Amendment violations including the Federal Tort Claims
Act. See Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 621, Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act: An
Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule?, 66 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1975). See
also Comment, The California Constitutional Right of Privacy and the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Civil Proceedings, 6 PEPPERDINE U. L. REV. 231 (1978) (arguing for the
extension of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings based on the fourth amend-
ment and the California Constitutional right of privacy).
39. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Jet-
ters, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
40. As noted in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions. Id. at 351. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973).
41. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (in the case of a lawful cus-
todial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under
that amendment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1968) (search incident to a
lawful arrest is limited to the area in which the arrestee can "reach" for a weapon
or destroy evidence); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search per-
mitted both of the arrestee's person and the premises where the arrest occurred).
42. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police in hot pursuit of an offender
may enter a premises without a warrant and look anywhere within the premises
where the offender might be hiding); see also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 746 (1963) (cases
involving search of suspect's house as part of, and immediately prior to arrest
therein).
43. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (with probable cause an automo-
bile, due to its mobility may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that
would not justify a warrantless search of a house or office). Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of a vehicle upon probable cause
that it contains contraband is allowable due to vehicle's mobility).
In vehicular searches incident to a traffic arrest, the state courts vary in their
approaches. See Note, .7he Scope of Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests in Califor-
nia: Rejecting the Federal Rule, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 317 (1974). The Supreme Court
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conducted pursuant to the consent of the subject of the search44
or an appropriate third party.45
Warrantless searches are not favored by the courts. The law
prefers the intervention of a detached and disinterested magis-
trate as provided by the warrant procedure, to limit the scope and
duration of the search and to assure that the search proceeds
upon adequate probable cause, rendering the intrusion of police
officers reasonable.46 Nonetheless, the law recognizes valid con-
sent searches as a legitimate exception to the warrant require-
ment and permits such searches because of their inherent
reasonableness. 47
expanded the scope of the person incident to a traffic arrest in United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
44. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also notes 48-90
infra, and accompanying text.
45. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964). See also Wefin & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Wefin & Miles], see also note 9 supra, and accompanying
text.
46. Johnston v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (Jackson, J.): "ITIhe
point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of those usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that the
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being, judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977): "Once a lawful search has
begun, it is far more likely that [the search] will not exceed proper bounds when
it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization 'particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.' Further, a warrant assures the
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the exe-
cuting officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search." Id. at 9.
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), the Court held that the "issu-
ing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he
must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the required ar-
rest or search." Id. at 350. The Court went on to hold that the requisite detach-
ment would be met so long as the magistrate "is removed from the prosecutor or
police and works within the judicial branch subject to supervision of the judge."
Id. at 351. In a subsequent case, the Court invalidated a warrant process that paid
a justice of the peace five dollars for each warrant issued, finding such a system to
be at odds with the requirement that warrants be issued by a "neutral judicial of-
ficer." Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
47. Wefin & Miles, supra note 45, at 217-27.
A. Voluntary Consent
1. Supreme Court Perspective
As with most rights, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures can be relinquished by voluntary consent.48
The standard for determining whether a consent is constitution-
ally valid and, therefore, an exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement 49 was established in the landmark case of
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.50 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a
six-to-three majority, 51 first reaffirmed that the prosecution bears
the onus of showing the existence of consent "freely and volunta-
rily given."5 2 Then he observed that:
[VI oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circum-
stances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor
to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate
such knowledge as a prerequisite to establish a voluntary consent.
5 3
Mr. Justice Stewart felt an appropriate standard of voluntariness
must accommodate both the public need for consensual searches
as a law enforcement tool and the interest of the individual to be
free from official coercion. 54 The Court observed that a balancing
of similar competing concerns had been reflected in pre-Miranda
confession cases in which a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach had been adopted for determining the voluntariness of ad-
missions of guilt.ss The Court in Miranda ultimately ruled that
48. Id.
49. See notes 44-47 supra, and accompanying text.
50. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. Id. In Bustamonte, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall each dis-
sented separately, see note 76 infra, and accompanying text.
52. 412 U.S. at 222. The Supreme Court first articulated this burden in Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Bumper was a third party consent case,
but the decision squarely rested on the issue of voluntariness. In that case, the
grandmother of a rape suspect permitted four law enforcement officers to search
her home, in which the suspect also resided. The purported consent was granted
after the officers claimed they possessed a search warrant, which they neither
read nor showed to the suspect's grandmother. Id. at 546-47. The Court held that
consent obtained by subterfuge is invalid, and cannot be voluntary. Id. at 548.
53. 412 U.S. at 248-49. Justice Traynor's analysis in People v. Michael, 45 Cal.
2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955), became the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's formal
adoption of the "totality of the circumstances" test. 412 U.S. at 221, 230-31. It was
held in Michael that: "(wI hether in a particular case an apparent consent was in
fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an express or implied assertion of
authority is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances."
45 Cal. 2d at 753, 290 P.2d at 854. In People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 98
Cal. Rptr. 193 (1971), the California text was further refined: "Consent to search
confers authority to search; established the reasonable nature of a search pre-
mised thereon; is not a waiver of a constitutional right; and is effective without
warning the person given the consent he might refuse to consent." Id. at 1015, 20
Cal. Rptr. at 198.
54. 412 U.S. at 225.
55. Id. at 226-27. See also Wefin & Miles, supra note 45, at 241.
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the state's failure to forewarn an individual in custody of his right
to remain silent rendered any confession invalid,56 without regard
to any other circumstances. In Bustamonte, however, Mr. Justice
Stewart rejected the notion that such warnings should be a pre-
requisite to a valid consent search.5 7 Stewart contrasted the in-
formal atmosphere of the individual's home or the highway,
where consent searches are likely to be rejected, with the inher-
ently coercive atmosphere in which custodial interrogations com-
monly occur, and concluded that with regard to consent searches,
warnings "would be thoroughly impractical." 58
Mr. Justice Stewart also rejected the constitutional waiver ap-
proach of Johnson v. Zerbst,5 9 that consent to search was "a relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," 60
which would have required that the consenting party know of his
right to refuse.61 This requirement has been applied to previous
fifth and sixth amendment cases. 6 2 The Bustamonte Court identi-
fied the purpose of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as ensuring
the right to a fair trial.63 Fourth amendment rights, on the other
hand, protect individual privacy from unreasonable state intru-
sion.6 4 Therefore, Mr. Justice Stewart, saw no reason to extend
the Zerbst standard to consensual searches and seizures. 65
Consequently, the Court determined that a prophylactic warn-
ing of the right to withhold consent was not required 66 and for-
56. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467 (1966).
57. 412 U.S. at 231.
58. Id. at 231-32. Recognizing that an officer's request to search might be
based on rapidly developing circumstances or as a consequence of an investiga-
tion, Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the Miranda decision was not intended to hin-
der police investigations.
59. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Zerbst, two defendants who had "stated that they
were ready for trial," were tried and convicted without the aid of counsel. Id. at
460. The Court in reversing, held that a waiver of one's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel must be knowingly and intelligently made. Id. at 468-69.
60. Id. at 464.
61. 412 U.S. at 235, 246.
62. See, e.g., Barker v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (right of confrontation);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (right against self-incrimination,
right to counsel); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957) (double jeop-
ardy); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (jury trial).
63. 412 U.S. at 236-37.
64. Id. at 228, 242. See also notes 36-47 supra, and accompanying text.
65. 412 U.S. at 242.
66. Id. at 213-33. Various commentators have criticized Justice Stewart's rea-
soning in Bustamonte, see, e.g., Comment, Valid Consent to Search Determined by
Standard of "Voluntariness", 12 Am. Cnmi. L. REV. 231, 249 (1974) (Court's decision
that voluntariness is to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances,
mally adopted and applied the "totality of the circumstances"
standard to noncustodial consent searches. 67 Soon thereafter, the
Court extended this test to a custodial situation in United States
v. Watson.68
2. Juvenile Court Perspective
Most courts that have considered consensual searches in a juve-
nile context have held that juveniles, like adults, can consent to a
search made without probable cause or a warrant.69 Even though
the United States Supreme Court appears to be espousing the
goal of full implementation of fundamental fairness in the juve-
nile context,7 0 it seems likely, given the judicial philosophy of the
Court's Bustamonte decision to support law enforcement activi-
ties, with its concomitant decrease of emphasis on individual
rights, that it will also extend the "totality of the circumstances"
test to juvenile cases. 71
This author, however, takes the position that due to their tender
age and comparative immaturity, juveniles should be afforded
even more rigorous safeguards than those applied to adults, when
it is claimed that a juvenile has voluntarily consented to a search.
absent any specific guidelines, might create more ambiguity and disparity in the
resolution of factually similar cases and "unintentionally" expand police power
"at the expense of the individual"); Note, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: A New Era
in Consent Searches, 35 U. Prrr. L. REV. 655, 669-70 (1974) ("the result [in Bus-
tamontel is an unfortunate weighing process which admits of no logical standard,
and undermines the Miranda rationale which requires "explicit knowledge of [a
constitutional] right" prior to effectuating a valid waiver); Note, The Doctrine of
Waiver and Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw, 891, 906 (1974) (the decision
has rendered the waiver concept "an overinflated word of art"). For an opinion
contrary to Bustamonte on the issue of whether consent requires a showing of
knowledge of the right waived, see State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
The court in Johnson held that whenever the state has the burden of showing that
the alleged waiver was voluntary, an essential element is the knowledge of the
right waived. Id. at 354-55, 346 A.2d at 68. See also note 82 supra, for further dis-
cussion of the knowledge of the right to refuse consent.
67. Id. at 227, for limiting language. See also id. at 421 n.29, 247 n.36.
68. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). For a thorough discussion of Watson see Note, War-
rantless Felony Arrests Made in Public are Valid Despite the Existence of Suffi-
cient Time to Obtain a Warrant: The "Totality of the Circumstances" Test Applies
to Consent Searches When Consent Was Given Subsequent to Arrest, 7 SETON HALL
L. REV. 891 (1976).
69. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 533 P.2d 1392 (Ore. App. 1975) (following the Bus-
tamonte rule); In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal.'Rptr. 37 (1970) (where
consent was held involuntary because entry into the juvenile's apartment was
gained through trickery); In re Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fam. Ct.
1963) (spontaneous confession of juvenile after street detention as indicia of vol-
untariness of consent to search). See also RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 8, at
67-69; S. Fox, THE LAw OF JUVEN E COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 124-25 (1971) thereinaf-
ter cited as NUTSHELL).
70. See note 17-34 supra, and accompanying text.
71. JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 8, at 66.
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The case of In re Williams, 72 illustrates an awareness of the
special problems involved in obtaining a juvenile's consent to a
search. Williams, a fifteen year old boy, was turned over to a state
trooper by a security guard who found him lurking between two
cottages at a resort. Williams took the trooper to his cottage and
showed him jewelry he had stolen. In holding the consent invalid,
the court stated:
[TIhe consent of this 15 year old boy given at 2 o'clock in the morning
while in police custody under a charge of third degree burglary and after
he had been questioned for several hours without the presence of his par-
ents or any other adult friend cannot be held to be a consent that was
given freely and intelligently without any duress or coercion, express or
implied. Unless we are prepared to say that because this boy is charged
with juvenile delinquency and not a crime, he has no right to be secure in
his person, papers, house and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure, the jewelry discovered in his bungalow is inadmissible against
him and must be suppressed.
7 3
In the more common non-custodial street situation, however,
most juvenile courts have not been as attentive to the "voluntari-
ness" requirement. For example, in In re Ronny,74 a police officer
observed a fifteen year old boy pass an unseen object to another
youth in exchange for money. When the officer approached the
boy and questioned him, the boy emptied his pockets, which con-
tained illegal drugs and the money he had received from the other
youth. As he produced these items, the youth confessed to the
sale of illegal drugs. Only then did the officer take him into cus-
tody. The court found that there had been no resistance or objec-
tion to the search. The boy's consent was, therefore, held to be
voluntary.75
•72. 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Fam. Ct. 1966).
73. Id. at 169-70, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 110. See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948), where the Court stated that a child "cannot be judged by more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens." Id. at 599. Plus, a youth may not
know how to protect his interests. As the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado, 270 U.S.
49 (1962), pointed out, where a fourteen year old was held incommunicado and
questioned for five days regarding a robbery, a child, in comparison with an adult,
cannot sense as fully the substantial consequences of a confession. Thus, the
Court has taken note of the inherent differences between adults and juveniles in
the past and has demanded that special care and scrutiny be taken in juvenile
cases.
74. 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fain. Ct. 1963).
75. In order to distinguish Ronny, one need only demonstrate the 'slightest
hesitation or resistance on the part of the juvenile; the only evidence of consent in
Ronny was the boy's spontaneous confession. Another example, of the courts fail-
ure to take into consideration the susceptibility of juveniles to intimidation in the
presence of police is In re Michael V., 10 Cal. 3d 676, 680, 517 P.2d 1145, 1147, 111
The major distinction between Williams and Ronny lies not in
the custodial/non-custodial difference, but rather, that the former
case recognized that there is a certain element of intimidation in-
herent in the very presence of an authority figure dressed in uni-
form, badge and weaponry. Because of this greater susceptibility
to such intimidation, juveniles require extra protection before
their consent to a search will be deemed voluntary.
In recognition of this, the American Law Institute's Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedures requires that if the person
searched is under the age of sixteen, the consent must be given
by his parent or guardian. 76 However, since juveniles not in cus-
tody may only be detained for brief periods, there will not always
be sufficient time to locate parents or guardians.7 7 Thus, to im-
pose such a requirement in this situation would effectively elimi-
nate non-custodial consent searches involving juveniles.7 8
However, in In re Gault79 the Supreme Court, in an adjudica-
tory context, recognized that children are generally more impres-
sionable and more easily intimidated by authority than adults,
and remarked that the voluntariness of a juvenile waiver made in
the absence of parents, counsel, or other adult is highly suspect.8 0
Undoubtedly, there are some situations in which the decision to
consent is the free and reasoned act of the juvenile himself. Yet
the presumption against the voluntariness of a consent made by a
juvenile in response to a police officer's request for consent to
search seems very strong, particularly in the case of children who
have not reached adolescence. In view of this, the courts might
better, on public policy alone, abolish juvenile consents entirely,
rather than risk the possibility of denying juveniles vital rights for
Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (1974) ("Okay boys, why don't you empty your pockets on the
car?" taken to be request for permission to search).
76. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT
§ 240.2(1)(a) (1975) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT], which pro-
vides:
(1) Persons from Whom Effective Consent May be Obtained. The consent
of justifying a search and seizure . . . must be given, in the case of:
(2) search of an individual's person, by the individual in question or, if
the person be under the age of 16, by such individual's parent or
guardian ....
77. In discussing the constitutional bounds of a "stop and frisk," Mr. Justice
White has stated that "given the proper circumstances the person may be briefly
detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
78. Prohibiting consent searches in the case of juveniles would contradict the
Supreme Court's stated conclusion that consent searches are a necessary police
practice. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28, 231-32 (1973).
79. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
80. Id. at 55.
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failure to estimate the effect of intimidation or greater susceptibil-
ity to apparent or real coercion on an impressionable mind.
But even if the courts fail to abolish juvenile non-custodial con-
sent searches, they can provide greater protection than those ac-
corded in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.8 1  This may be
accomplished by providing juveniles with the additional support
necessary to make police encounters less intimidating. Such sup-
port may be derived, first, from extending to juveniles the right to
be informed of their right to refuse consent8 2 and, second, from
giving to a juvenile who has been taken into custody notice of his
right to counsel before consent is obtained.83
81. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
82. See CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT, note 76, supra, at § 240.2(a), providing in
part:
(2) Required Warning to Persons in Custody or Under Arrest. Before un-
dertaking a search,. . . an officer present shall inform the individual
whose consent is sought that he is under no obligation to give such
consent and that anything found may be taken and used in evidence.
See generally JusTIcE STANDARis, note 8, supra, at 67-68; Note, Preadjudicating
Confessions and Consent Searches: Placing the Juvenile on the Same Constitu-
tional Footing as an Adult, 57 B.U.L. REV. 778, 790-91 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Consent Searches]. See also the separate dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275, 276, 277
(1973). Mr. Justice Douglas stated that mere "verbal assent" was insignificant, in-
ferring that an indication of knowledge of a right to refuse consent was necessary.
Id. at 275. Mr. Justice Brennan also inferred that knowledge of a right to refuse
consent was necessary, arguing that the majority's holding would permit a person
to waive a constitutional right despite the fact that he might be unaware of its
existence. Id. at 277. Mr. Justice Marshall felt that knowledge of a right to refuse
consent was an indispensable element in a valid consent search. Id. at 285. He
noted that such knowledge could be demonstrated by the defendant's responses at
the time of the search such as a prior refusal of consent or by a showing of "prior
experience of training" of the defendant indicating the awareness of this right. Id.
at 286. Although he recognized these methods of demonstrating knowledge of the
defendant, he stated that the prosecution's burden of showing knowledge would
disappear if the police informed defendant of his rights at the time of the search.
Id.
It did not take New Jersey long to see the reason of these dissents, for in State
v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A. 2d 66 (1975), its court concluded that: "[u]nless it is
shown by the State that the person involved knew that he had the right to refuse
to accede to such a request [for consent), his assenting ... is not meaningful."
Id. at 354-55, 346 A.2d at 68. See also note 66 supra.
83. See CODE OF PRE-ARAIGNMdENT, note 76 supra, at § 240.2(3), providing in
pertinent part:
(3) Required Warning to Persons in Custody or Under Arrest. If the indi-
vidual whose consent is sought ... is in custody or under arrest at
the time such consent is offered or invited, such consent shall not
justify a search and seizure ... unless in addition to the warning re-
quired by subsection (2) [id note 551, such individual has been in-
formed that he has a right to consult an attorney, either retained or
With regard to the latter, frequently the atmosphere of a police
station is more intimidating than that of a public street;84 thus
providing for the assistance of counsel in making the consent de-
cision at a police station is mandated. The former recommenda-
tion, of informing juveniles of their right to refuse consent,
alleviates the compulsion to cooperate, which was part of the rea-
soning applied in Miranda v. Arizona.85 The Court stated in Mi-
randa that the warning of the right to remain silent "is an
absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere." 86 The recommendation to provide for
counsel serves a similar function in connection with consent
searches.
Moreover, these recommendations serve to eliminate the arbi-
trariness and subjective inquiries inherent in determining the vol-
untariness of a consent from the "totality of the circumstances."
By utilizing these recommendations, an objective determination
of voluntariness is more easily made, resulting in clearer guide-
lines for police and less arbitrary decision making. Additionally,
according to the hypothesis of In re Gault87 that procedural fair-
ness increases the prospects of rehabilitation, adoption of these
requirements should help decrease the number of repeating of-
fenders. Consequently, the effectiveness of police in combatting
juvenile crime should be enhanced.
But even if these recommendations are not given constitutional
status in the federal courts, they should be adopted legislatively88
or constitutionally in state courts as a matter of public policy.
89
appointed, and to communicate with relatives or friends, before de-
ciding whether to grant or withhold consent.
See generally, JUSTICE STANDARDS, note 8 supra, at 67-68; Consent Searches, supra
note 82, at 791-92; Note, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1149
(1968); Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights of Minors: A Question of Law or
Fact, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 223 (1967).
84. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973).
85. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. Id. at 468.
87. 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
88. Consent Searches, note 82, supra at 779, advocates that legislatures enact
these requirements now rather than waiting for judicial action so as to insure that
juveniles receive full protection immediately.
89. If the state court can base its ruling on the State constitution, Supreme
Court review will be effectively precluded because the Supreme Court will not re-
view a decision resting on adequate state grounds. At the close of his opinion for
the Court in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), Mr. Justice Black indicated
that a state may impose higher standards on searches and seizures than the fed-
eral constitution requires. Id. at 62; accord, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975). Recently, a few state courts have reconsidered their own constitutions in
order to afford greater protection of individual rights, and impose stricter re-
straints on law enforcement officers. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346
A.2d 66 (1975), holding that an essential element of a voluntary consent is the
knowledge of the right to refuse consent. Id. at 354-55, 346 A.2d at 68.
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Furthermore, it should be noted that even if there is a resulting
hinderance in law enforcement, the recommendations are not un-
reasonable. The Fourth Amendment itself was designed to hinder
unfettered invasions of privacy by the state.90 Juvenile consent
searches conducted without a warrant and without adequate safe-
guards provide the kind of invasion most intrusive and most sub-
ject to abuse. When the result of permitting such an invasion is
to forfeit effectively the juvenile's constitutional rights, the possi-
ble hinderance to police investigation by the safeguards proposed
here are not only justified, but mandated.
B. Parental Consent
1. Parental Waiver of Juvenile Rights
The recognition of parental authority is as old as reported his-
tory. Both law and society have continued to recognize parental
authority over the activities of a child living in the family home.
Most courts have extrapolated on the parent-child relationship to
conclude that a parent may waive the rights of a child to allow a
warrantless search of the "child's room, closet, bureau or other
area of the family home used by him."9 1 This, of course, would
partially nullify the personal protection of the Fourth Amend-
Hawaii, California, and Pennsylvania have all circumvented the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment which permits use of Miranda vio-
lations for impeachment purposes, by interpreting similar worded clauses in their
respective state constitutions. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 292 P.2d 657 (1971);
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975). Hawaii and California have both circum-
vented Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment which permits a
full custodial search after arrest for a minor traffic violation, by using similarly
worded clauses in their state constitutions. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d
51 (1974); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 19 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975). Michigan has circumvented Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment which permits warrantless consensual electronic surveillance by bas-
ing its decision on similar language in the state constitution. People v. Beavers,
393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975).
For discussion and commentary on the recent use of state constitutions to ac-
cord greater protection of individual rights see Falk, The State Constitution: A
More Than "Adequate" Non-Federal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973); Com-
ment, Expanding State Constitutional Protections and the New Silver Platter: Af-
ter They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the Window, 8 LOYOLA U.L.J. 186 (1976);
Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Requirements, 13 Duo. L. REV. 577
(1975); Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
481 (1974).
90. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
91. NuTsHEL, note 11 supra, at 102-03. See also Searches and Seizures, note 36
ment. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the bases which jus-
tify the limitations of this constitutional guarantee.
The majority of parental consent cases 92 have held that, despite
the fact that the juvenile did not personally consent to the search
of his room in the family home, evidence against him is rendered
admissible if his parent had validly 93 consented to a search of the
room. His parents can literally release incriminating evidence to
the police who would, except for the parental permission, be vio-
lating his constitutional rights by searching without a warrant.
In State v. Kinderman,94 the court held that the father of a
twenty-two year old male, who was living in the father's house,
could by freely and willingly giving his consent to search the en-
tire house, make any search of that house reasonable. 95 The court
agreed that the child had a constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures and asserted "if a man's house is still his
castle in which his rights are superior to the state, those rights
should also be superior to the rights of children who live in his
house."96 Consequently, the child's protection was to be viewed
"in light of the father's right to waive it."97
More enlightened courts, however, have rejected the concept of
supra, at 30-31; JUSTICE STANDARDS, note 8 supra, at 68; Wefin & Miles, note 45
supra, at 267-68.
92. See People v. Mortimer, 46 App. Div. 405, 361 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1974). Sorenson
v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Scholt, 289 Minn. 175, 192
N.W.2d 878 (1971); People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971);
Vandenburg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1970); Rivers
v. State, 266 So. 2d 337 (S. Ct. Fla. 1969); People v. Thomas, 120 Ill. App. 2d 219, 256
N.E.2d 870 (1969); State v. Vidor, 75 Wash. 2d 607, 452 P.2d 961 (1969); Tolbert v.
State, 224 Ga. 291, 161 S.E.2d 279 (1968); People v. Clark, 252 Cal. App. 2d 479, 60
Cal. Rptr. 569 (1967); Commonwealth v. Hardy, 423 Pa. 208, 223 A.2d 719 (1966);
Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn.
405, 136 N.W. 2d 577 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1965); McCray v. State, 236
Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964); Ress v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 127 S.E.2d 406
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 964 (1963). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953 &
Supp. 1978).
93. To be valid, consent must be freely and voluntarily given. See notes 48-67
supra and accompanying text.
94. 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W. 2d 577 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1965).
95. Id. at 412, 136 N.W.2d at 582.
96. Id. at 409, 136 N.W.2d at 580.
97. Id. It should be noted that Justice Otis, who dissented in Kinderman,
pointed out that the youth involved was not a juvenile and that the mere fact that
a son lived with his parents should not have resulted in a loss of constitutional
rights. More specifically he stated:
I find nothing in such parent-child relationship from which implied con-
sent to a search and seizure of the kind here may be inferred. With or
without the payment of rent, I submit the Constitution requires that de-
fendant's privacy be respected and that his clothing located in living
quarters exclusively occupied by him to be insulated from intrusion with-
out a warrant....
Id. at 418, 136 N.W.2d at 585.
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parental consent as an effective waiver of a juvenile's Fourth
Amendment rights. In People v. Flowers,9 8 the father of a seven-
teen year old boy,99 living at home, attending school, and being
supported by his parents, consented to a warrantless search of his
son's room. The court specifically rejected the state's position
that the combined right of control of the premises by the parent
and his right of control over his son, permitted the waiver of the
son's privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures. 100
The court observed:
Michigan cases have held that an attorney cannot waive the search privi-
lege of his client. . . .Nor can a defendant's grandmother who owned the
premises where the defendant resided.... To these, we now add, a par-
ent who has no personal or punishable involvement in a crime suspected
or charged.1 0 1
Interestingly, the court in Flowers cited Kinderman and specifi-
cally refused to adopt the Kinderman holding despite the similar
facts of both cases.102
In Reeves v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,103 the defendant
was living with his mother when police officers requested and
were given permission by the mother to search her son's room.
The court held the consent invalid, although the defendant's
mother often entered his room to put his laundry away in a bu-
reau, because "the room in question and the bureau in it [were]
set aside exclusively for (defendant's] regular use.' 0 4
As Flowers and Reeves indicate, the concept of parental author-
ity to consent should not be permitted to circumvent a juvenile's
98. 23 Mich. App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
99. He was arraigned as an adult.
100. 23 Mich. App. at 526, 179 N.W.2d at 58.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. The court enunciated that "[Kinderman] fail [s to separate the consti-
tutional rights of the son, who is the real and only defendant." Id. The court pre-
mised its decision on Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (a hotel clerk
consented to a search of defendant's room while the latter was held in custody).
In Stoner, the Court held, inter alia, that a personal waiver of one's right to pri-
vacy was imperative. The Court reasoned that one's fourth amendment rights
were not to be "eroded by strained applications of agency or by unrealistic doc-
trines of apparent authority." Id. at 488. Furthermore, it reasoned that "it was the
[defendant's] constitutional right which was at stake ... not the hotel's. It was a
right, therefore, which only the [defendant] could waive .... Id. at 489 (empha-
sis added).
103. 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
104. Id. at 924-25. See also Shorey v. Warden, 401 F.2d 474, 478 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 915 (1968), where the court recognized, also, that a room or
area can be set aside exclusively for an individual's use even though another per-
son has access to that room or area for a limited purpose.
fourth amendment rights to object to unreasonable searches and
seizures.
2. The Juvenile's Right of Privacy
In People v. Nunn,105 a nineteen year old defendant's room had
been searched with the consent of his mother. About ten days
before the search, the defendant had moved out of the house,
locked the door of his room, and had instructed his mother not to
allow anyone to enter. Police subsequently used their own pass
key to enter, after receipt of the mother's written consent.10 6 The
court, relying principally on Katz v. United States,0 7 held that the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that this
reasonable expectation was afforded protection by the rights
granted in the Fourth Amendment.10 8 The court adopted and ap-
plied the "expectation of privacy" doctrine and found that the
mother did not have authority to consent to the search of her
son's room.10 9
Subsequent to Nunn, the Supreme Court rendered its decision
in United States v. Matlock." 0 In Matlock, a woman who shared a
bedroom with the defendant gave police permission to search the
room. Police found evidence, later introduced at defendant's trial,
in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room. The court, in refus-
ing to invalidate the search, held that authority to consent to the
search of a place turns on "mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for most purposes.""' An
earlier case rejected the notion that authority to consent to a
search rested on subtle distinctions developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of property law which, more
than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinc-
tions largely historical.112
In People v. Stacy," 3 the Illinois court in synthesizing Matlock
and Nunn," 4 recognized that the Nunn requirement that "the
105. 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974).
106. Id. at 348, 304 N.E.2d at 83.
107. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. Id. at 351.
109. 55 Ill. 2d at 351, 304 N.E.2d at 87. The court stated that the mother had set
the room aside for the son's exclusive use, subject only to her housekeeping activi-
ties and her care of his personal effects. Id. at 348, 304 N.E.2d at 83.
110. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
111. Id. at 171.
112. Jones v. United States, 372 U.S. 256, 267 (1960).
113. 58 Ill. 2d 83, 317 N.E.2d 24 (1974).
114. The court stated that:
Although Matlock did not adopt the 'expectation of privacy' test of Nunn,
the results in the two cases are not inconsistent. If one has consented to
the 'mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access
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person searched must have an actual expectation of privacy, and
this expectation must be reasonable,"" 5 is merely the converse of
the Matlock expression that no right of privacy exists where it is
"reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the
right to permit the inspection in his own right."116 Nonetheless,
the Stacy court went on to deemphasize the subjective "expecta-
tion of privacy" test, stating that it is "irrelevant" and that "the
validity of the search . . . is to be judged by the more objective
'common authority' test of Matlock."117
A further extension of the Stacy analysis is indicated in In In-
terest of Salyer,118 where a fifteen year old boy's room was
searched without a search warrant but with consent of his
mother. The court upheld the search even though the juvenile
kept his room locked and prevented his mother from entering it
except on infrequent occasions.1 19 The court reasoned that paren-
tal consent to search a juvenile's room is implicit in the rights and
duties imposed on parents by law.120 Furthermore, the court
pointed out that it would be absurd to "say that a mother with a
child of 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 has no authority over the
room occupied by her child in her home.' 2 1 The court then advo-
cated that the standard adopted by the Illinois legislature "in de-
claring that a child of 18 is of age,"'122 be utilized as the line of
demarcation for parental consent to search and seize personal
items in a child's room.
or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any
of the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might
permit the common area to be searched,' these facts would indicate that
the co-occupant has likewise surrendered his expectation of privacy in the
property.
Id. at 88-89, 317 N.E.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
115. 55 Ill. 2d at 348, 304 N.E.2d 84.
116. 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
117. 58 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 317 N.E.3d at 27.
118. 44 Ill. App. 854, 358 N.E.2d 1333 (1977).
119. Id. at 855, 857, 358 N.E.2d at 1334-35, 1337.
120. Id. at 856, 358 N.E.2d at 1336. The court also distinguished Nunn on its
facts. In the instant case, the juvenile had, since he was ten years of age, been the
sole occupant of the room, and some similar conduct and arrangements had been
involved. Also, the court "noted as a distinctive element, that unlike the Nunn
case, there was no showing of any instruction to the mother to let no one else
come into the room." Id. But see note 100 supra, and accompanying text.
121. Id. at 857, 358 N.E.2d at 1337.
122. Id. Under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 §§ 131, 132 (1975), persons under the age of
eighteen are considered minors and parents generally are entitled to custody of
the person of their minor children.
To accept such an approach would again provide the juvenile
with the "worst of both worlds."123 Whether or not society ap-
proves of unrestricted parental authority should not be disposi-
tive of a juvenile's Fourth Amendment rights in objecting to
unreasonable searches and seizures. Likewise, to premise such
an argument on the parent's control and access over most por-
tions of the premises 124 is to deflect the real issue. The fourth
amendment defines a juvenile's rights and only he should be al-
lowed to waive them.125
Moreover, to sanction parental waiver of juvenile rights engen-
ders the deterioration and debasement of the trust and confidence
on which the familial relationship is premised. The end result is
the frustration of the juvenile court philosophy of creating a per-
ception of fairness 26 and the thwarting of the juvenile's prospects
for rehabilitation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The major consequence of Kent v. United States127 and In re
Gault12 8 has been the judicial and social philosophy that
123. See note 15, supra and accompanying text.
124. Under United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), third party consents
are measured by the relationship of the consenting party to the place searched,
and not his relationship to the ultimate defendant. See Matthews, Third-Party
Consent Searches: Some Necessary Safeguards, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 29, 32-33 (1976).
While one may enjoy actual control or access over most portions of a house, he
may not consent to a search of areas which are in actuality held privately by the
defendant. See Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for
Reevaluation, 4 CRIm. L. BuLL- 343, 344 (1968). For example, consent by a home-
owner to search the room occupied by his brother-in-law, a casual guest, was held
valid, but consent to search his personal effects located in that room was not since
the evidence indicated no right of access or actual access to it. State v. Johnson,
85 N.M. 465, 513 P.2d 399 (1973). Thus, if X and Y share an apartment, but each
maintains a separate bedroom kept private from the other, X may consent to a
search of his bedroom and the common living quarters, but not to Y's bedroom.
125. The Supreme Court stated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
that ". . . the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at
351. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to conclude that the employee's desk in
United States v. Blok, 188 F. 2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951), was more exclusive to defend-
ant than a juvenile's bedroom. The employee occupied the desk for only a limited
period of time each day. A juvenile may live in his parent's home for an indefinite
period of time and would consider these premises his own within the meaning of
protected privacy. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment requires that a juvenile's
privacy be respected and that his personal effects located in his bedroom exclu-
sively occupied by him be insulated from intrusion without a warrant unless per-
sonally waived by him.
126. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
127. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
128. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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juveniles are not to be punished but rather rehabilitated through
the use of special procedures.1 29 The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that a juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation are greatest
when he perceives his treatment fair. 3 0 The recommendations
herein promote such perceptions. By taking time to locate a juve-
nile's parent or guardian, a police officer would impress upon the
juvenile the integrity of the court process. Further, in receiving
notification of the right to refuse consent and the right to counsel
during a custodial search, a juvenile would learn that compulsion
has no role in the juvenile justice system.131 Additionally, the
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is that it protects reason-
able expectations of privacy of the individual and not simply
places against unreasonable searches and seizures.132 Such con-
stitutional safeguards should only be waived by the juvenile him-
self not his parents, and then, only when guided by the
safeguards suggested in this commentary. These recommenda-
tions would implement the juvenile court philosophy that rehabil-
itation begins with a perception of fair judicial procedures.
LARRY T. PLEISS
129. Id. at 15-16.
130. Id. at 36.
131. See State v. Shaw, 93 Ariz. 40, 47, 378 P.2d 487, 491 (1963), where the court
stated: "The need for special treatment begins at the instant the juvenile is con-
tacted by peace officers ......
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

